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Abstract
In many labor markets, e.g., for lawyers, consultants, MBA students, and professional
sport players, workers get offered and sign long-term contracts even though waiting
could reveal significant information about their capabilities. This phenomenon is called
unraveling. We examine the link between wage bargaining and unraveling. Two firms, an
incumbent and an entrant, compete to hire a worker of unknown talent. Informational
frictions prevent the incumbent from always observing the entrant’s arrival, inducing
unraveling in all equilibria. We analyze the extent of unraveling, surplus shares, the
average talent of employed workers, and the distribution of wages within and across
firms.
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versity, School of Management, New Haven, CT 06511, email: aniko.oery@yale.edu; Vigier: BI Norwegian
Business School, email: a.h.vigier@gmail.com. We thank Nicholas Chow and Hungni Chen for excellent
research assistance. We are grateful to Dirk Bergemann, Simon Board, Joyee Deb, Jeff Ely, Brett Green, Jo-
hannes Hörner, Lisa Kahn, Teddy Kim, Sebastian Kodritsch, Fei Li, Ilse Lindenlaub, Espen Moen, Guiseppe
Moscarini, Pauli Murto, Peter Norman, Theodore Papageorgiou, Larry Samuelson, Utku Ünver, Leeat Yariv,
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1 Introduction
On May 23rd 2015 Martin Ødegaard became the youngest player to represent Real Madrid.
Nineteen months later, he was loaned to SC Heerenveen, a dutch football club ranked 441st
worldwide. In many labor markets, talent is a scarce resource and an individual’s true capa-
bility takes some time to be determined. Yet the demand for talent is steadily increasing.1
Problems related to the timing of recruitment are therefore commonplace far beyond the foot-
ball industry. It is for instance well documented that law firms and consultancies tend to
recruit students long before graduation.2 Presumably, efficiency could be improved if firms
instead waited to know more about talent.
There exists a rich literature studying “unraveling”, yet the interplay with wage bargaining
remains largely unexplored. This is somewhat surprising since, if firms are uncertain about
talent, then bargaining ought to be a key determinant of the timing of recruitment. The
principal contribution of our paper is to shed light on the link between wage bargaining and
unraveling. How does between-firm competition for talented workers determine unraveling?
How is surplus shared among firms and workers? What is the relationship between the way
surplus is shared and unraveling? What implications does this have for the distribution of
wages within and across firms?
Our stylized model has the following features. Two firms A (the incumbent) and B (the
entrant) compete to hire a worker of unknown talent. Competition is measured by the intensity
of firm B’s (random) arrival process. Informational frictions prevent A from always observing
B’s arrival. Both firms make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the worker, that can be revised over
time. As time goes by, the market gradually learns the talent of the worker. The game ends
the instant the worker accepts an offer from one of the two firms.
The role of informational frictions in wage bargaining has been emphasized on numerous
occasions in the search literature. Two opposing views have been expressed. Burdett and Coles
(2003) argue that outside offers are not verifiable and are therefore ignored by the current
firm.3 By contrast, Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006) provide empirical evidence that
1See Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993), Autor, Levy and Murnane (2003), Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt
(2002), or Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding (2017).
2See Roth (1984), Roth and Xing (1994), Avery, Jolls, Posner and Roth (2001), or Fréchette, Roth and
Ünver (2007).
3In the setting we analyze, the role of this feature is to impart bargaining power to the entrant. In a similar
spirit Mortensen (2005) points out that “Making counter-offers is not the norm in many labour markets. More
typically, a worker who informs his employer of a more lucrative outside option is first congratulated and then
asked to clear out immediately”. Similarly, Shimer (2006) considers a bargaining protocol in which as soon
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counter-offers do matter for wage determination. The framework we propose aims to reconcile
both views by adding informational frictions to a simple search model: when informational
frictions are small firms effectively Bertrand compete for the worker, and when these frictions
are large, the worker automatically gets hired by the entrant. We find that informational
frictions have very important implications regarding equilibrium unraveling. Among other
things, absent informational frictions unraveling never occurs.
The model’s efficient outcome balances the gain from waiting to learn the worker’s realized
talent versus the loss from delaying hiring in case the worker is in fact talented. By contrast,
the basic tension underlying the non-cooperative outcome is the following. On the one hand,
the expectation of future competition from B creates an incentive for A to make generous
offers to the worker early on. On the other hand, the worker’s reservation wage internalizes
future competition. By pushing the reservation wage above the worker’s current expected
productivity, the latter effect induces the incumbent to wait before making offers acceptable
to the worker.
We show that all equilibria exhibit some amount of unraveling: with some probability the
worker is hired before the social optimum. The intuition is that if B’s arrival occurs before
the worker has accepted an offer from A then part of the social surplus transfers over to B.
Consequently, relative to the social planner’s point of view, from the worker and firm A’s
perspective the gain from waiting to learn the worker’s realized talent is strictly lower. The
worker and firm A thus reach an agreement too early. This mechanism emphasizes the role of
informational frictions. Absent informational frictions, if upon B’s arrival the worker were still
unemployed then the entire social surplus would go to the worker, in which case the worker
and firm A’s incentives would be aligned with those of the social planner.
Our results also highlight a novel trade-off between unraveling and inequality: the more
equal the division of surplus between the incumbent and the worker, the greater the extent of
unraveling. Intuitively, when bargaining power is distributed evenly between the worker and
firm A then B is able to claim a large part of the surplus. This in turn lowers the worker and
firm A’s gain from waiting to learn the worker’s realized talent. We find in addition that the
trade-off between unraveling and inequality becomes more severe when informational frictions
increase.
While the model exhibits multiple equilibria (which differ regarding the players’ respective
shares of the surplus), interestingly the time at which firm A makes its first acceptable offer
as a worker meets a new firm, the worker first decides whether to switch or not and then bilaterally bargains
with the new firm.
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to the worker is the same in all equilibria. Characterizing this time enables us to quantify the
extent of unraveling, and to make sharp predictions regarding the effect of various parameters.
We show for instance that the basic tension at the heart of our model induces a non-monotonic
relationship between competition and unraveling. When competition is low, increasing com-
petition worsens unraveling. When competition is high, more competition reduces unraveling.
Hence, unraveling is maximized when competition is intermediate.
We analyze the extent of unraveling at firm B relative to firm A. Counter to intuition,
unraveling can be worse at B than at A. The reason is that anytime B’s arrival is unobserved
by A, then the worker’s upside potential from waiting instantly drops, as does the worker’s
reservation wage. When offers from A are greater than the new reservation wage, B is then
forced to hire the worker without further delay. Interestingly, in equilibrium, workers of
identical talent can be hired at varying wages both within a given firm, and across the two
firms. This finding is consistent with empirical evidence on residual wage dispersion that finds
that workers with the same education receive different wages.4 Finally, we show that while
more competition benefits the worker and hurts A, firm B can be better or worse off. By
contrast, informational frictions always benefit the firms and hurt the worker. Our results can
also be applied to tenure contracts that are common in law and consulting firms, as well as
in academia.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simplified two-period example
illustrating the basic tension at the heart of our analysis. The model is presented in Section
3. Sections 4 and 5 contain some preliminaries. The core analysis is presented in Section 6.
The comparative statics results are in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Related Literature. We contribute to the literature on unraveling by exploring the link
between wage bargaining and unraveling. Unlike this paper, the literature has focused for the
most part on matching markets (see recent contributions by Echenique and Pereyra (2016) and
Du and Livne (2016) for an overview of this strand of research). In Li and Rosen (1998) and Li
and Suen (2000) contracting early on acts as an insurance device by which individuals reduce
the risks implied by matching after all uncertainty has been resolved. In our setting, insurance
plays no role since all parties are risk-neutral. Our model is closer to Damiano, Li and Suen
(2005) and Ambuehl and Groves (2017). Damiano et al. (2005) develop a friction-based theory
of unraveling. However, the mechanism they identify is very different from ours since there is
4See Lemieux (2006), or Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux (2009).
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no uncertainty in their framework.5 Like us, Ambuehl and Groves (2017) examine a setting
in which talent is learned along the way, and where firms make early offers in an attempt to
avoid future competition. However, the focus of their paper is different from ours, and there
is no wage bargaining in their setting.6
Our work is closely linked to the non-cooperative bargaining literature with symmetric
information about an uncertain surplus and more than two players pioneered by Merlo and
Wilson (1995). The authors show that efficiency obtains as long as all players are required
to agree on a sharing rule. Allowing for general voting rules, Eraslan and Merlo (2002) show
that (a) unraveling can occur and (b) multiple equilibria can exist. Rather than institutional
voting rules, in our framework informational frictions are the drivers of unraveling.
Three recent papers study the impact of learning and/or potential entry on bargaining
with one-sided asymmetric information. Fuchs and Skrzypacz (2010) study a model in which
outside options arrive at a stochastic date, while Daley and Green (2017) study bargaining
where the parties obtain information about the uncertain surplus through an exogenous news
process. Lomys (2017) analyzes the interaction of learning and potential entry in bargaining.
The focus of these papers is on Coasean forces, and trade is inefficiently delayed. In sharp
contrast trade occurs inefficiently early in our setting.
Finally, as noted earlier, our paper is closely related to the on-the-job search literature, in
which the role of outside offers in wage bargaining occupies a prominent place.7 More broadly,
our work contributes to the employer learning literature (e.g., Farber and Gibbons (1996),
Altonji and Pierret (2001), Lange (2007), Kahn and Lange (2014)). Unlike those papers, our
focus is on learning prior to hiring, and we abstract away from the issue of investment into
talent explored in Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) and Autor (2001) among others.
5The market in Damiano et al. (2005) operates in two rounds, and agents incur a cost for each round in
which they participate. The unique equilibrium is such that no one participates in the second round, and all
agents accept to match in the first round.
6In a similar spirit, Halaburda (2010) obtains unraveling as less attractive firms offer early contracts, which
workers accept due to the fact that they are on the long side of the market and may otherwise never get a job.
7In addition to the papers cited earlier, our paper is somewhat related to Moscarini et al. (2004). There,
the degree to which a firm commits not to compete is called “corporate culture”. The fact that it may be
profitable for firms to commit ex ante not to match outside offers has also been pointed out by Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2004). In that spirit, one possible interpretation is to view the informational frictions in our
framework as a commitment device for the incumbent firm.
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2 A Simple Two-Period Example
The following two-period example highlights the main trade-off of the model. Consider two
firms, A and B, and one worker interacting over two periods. The worker is unemployed at
the beginning of period 1, with unknown talent, high (H) or low (L). Firm A (the incumbent)
arrives at t “ 1. With probability λ P p0, 1q firm B (the entrant) arrives at t “ 2, and with
probability 1´ λ firm B never arrives. For instance, the worker might be a trainee at firm A,
and firm B a competing firm looking to fill an opening position. Ex-ante the probability of H
is p0. A H-worker produces b ą 0 and a L-worker produces ´c ă 0. A firm produces zero if it
does not hire the worker. The worker’s talent is publicly revealed at t “ 2, but if firm A waits
and hires the worker at t “ 2 then both firm A and the worker incur a cost r ą 0. We assume
that waiting is socially optimal, i.e., p1 ´ p0qc ą 2r.
8 The worker has no intrinsic preference
for any of the two firms, which compete on the wage in order to hire the worker. Each period
until the worker is hired, firm A makes a take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) offer to the worker. If
the first offer is rejected the game moves on to period 2. We assume that with probability
β P p0, 1q informational frictions prevent A from verifying B’s arrival. The bargaining protocol
in period 2 is as follows. If A observed B’s arrival, then A and B simultaneously make TIOLI
offers to the worker. If B’s arrival was unobserved, then A makes its offer first; B observes
the offer from A, and follows with a counter-offer.
We uncover the unique equilibrium by backward induction. At t “ 2, either A observes
B or it does not. If talent is H and A observes B, then both firms simultaneously offer b.
However, if A does not observe B, then each firm offers 0.9 Hence, the worker’s expected
payoff from rejecting an offer at t “ 1 is given by
ŵ “ λp1´ βqp0b´ r;
ŵ is also the worker’s reservation wage at t “ 1.
We now examine t “ 1. Firm A can either offer ŵ, or make an offer which the worker
rejects. In the first case, the expected payoff of A is rp0b ´ p1 ´ p0qcs ´ rλp1 ´ βqp0b ´ rs “
r ´ p1 ´ p0qc ` rp1 ´ λqp1 ´ βq ` βsp0b; in the second case, the expected payoff of A is
p1 ´ λqp0b ´ r. It ensues that A makes an offer which the worker rejects if and only if
8The social gain from waiting until t “ 2 is c if the worker’s talent is L, whereas the social cost is 2r.
9If A does not observe B, then no (strictly) positive offer is optimal from A’s perspective: either B has not
arrived and then 0 is acceptable for the worker, or B has arrived in which case A must offer more than b in
order to hire the worker.
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expected payoff of B
ą 0.
The condition above can be decomposed as follows. The term inside the first square bracket
represents the efficiency gain from waiting until t “ 2. The term inside the second square
bracket represents the share of surplus accruing to firm B at t “ 2 but evaluated at t “ 1.
The difference between the first and second square brackets thus represents the worker and
firm A’s joint incentive to wait until t “ 2.
The simple two-period example examined above illustrates well the basic tension at the
heart of our model. On the one hand, future competition from B creates an incentive for A to
hire the worker early on: the expected payoff of A from waiting until t “ 2 is p1´ λqp0b´ r,
which is decreasing in λ. On the other hand, the worker’s reservation wage internalizes future
competition: ŵ is increasing in λ. Whenever ŵ is greater than the worker’s current expected
productivity, p0b´ p1´ p0qc, the latter effect induces A to wait until t “ 2 before making an
offer acceptable to the worker. Finally note that, absent informational frictions (that is, for
β “ 0), efficient always obtains.
This two-period example is unfortunately too stylized to capture some crucial aspects of
the more general setting. Whereas with two periods the worker’s reservation wage is equal to
0 in the last period, with an infinite (time) horizon the worker’s reservation wage is always
strictly greater than 0 as long as the worker’s talent remains uncertain. As we will see, this
feature turns out to have profound consequences. First, the infinite-horizon model exhibits
multiple equilibria, which differ regarding efficiency and the players’ respective shares of the
surplus. Second, whereas in the two-period example increasing competition always worsens
unraveling, in general the relationship between competition and unraveling is in fact non-
monotonic. Finally, we show that for unraveling to occur, informational frictions are both
necessary and sufficient in the infinite-horizon model.
3 Model
The model is an infinite-horizon analogue of the two-period example studied in Section 2.
Time is discrete and denoted by t P T∆ :“ t0,∆, 2∆, . . . u where ∆ ą 0 is the length of a
period. We next lay out the details of the model.
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Talent and Payoffs. The worker’s talent is ω P tH,Lu: the worker produces b ą 0 if ω “ H
and ´c ă 0 if ω “ L. The probability that the worker’s talent is H is given by p0 P p0, 1q.
The worker’s payoff from unemployment is normalized to 0; her (undiscounted) payoff from
becoming employed equals her wage, w.10 A firm’s payoff from hiring the worker is b ´ w if
ω “ H and ´c´w if ω “ L. A firm’s payoff is normalized to 0 if it does not hire the worker.
In every period, the discount factor of all players is given by e´r∆.
Learning. Learning about talent occurs through the worker’s slip-ups: if her talent is H
the worker never slips up whereas if ω “ L each period the probability of a slip-up is given
by 1 ´ e´η∆, where η ą 0. Let pt denote the posterior probability assigned to ω “ H after
observing the number of slip-ups having occurred by t. Applying Bayes’ rule, pt “ 0 after the
first slip-up; on the other hand, as long as the worker does not slip up, in the limit as ∆ Ñ 0,
pt evolves according to the differential equation
9pt “ ηptp1´ ptq. (1)
Thus, in particular, pt is increasing in t conditional on no slip-up. To avoid repetitions, all
derivatives with respect to time will be understood conditional on no slip-up. The expected
(undiscounted) social surplus from hiring the worker at time t is denoted St, that is,
St :“ Spptq :“ ptb´ p1´ ptqc.
It is easy to check that in the limit (as ∆ Ñ 0) St evolves according to 9St “ ηp1´ ptqpSt ` cq.
As will become clear later (see Remark 1 at the end of this section), in the types of envi-
ronment we examine, private information of the incumbent plays limited role. For expository
simplicity we therefore assume that learning is public, that is, the worker’s slip-ups are ob-
served by all players. Thus, throughout the game, pt represents the players’ common belief
that ω “ H, henceforth simply referred to as the belief.
Competition and Informational Frictions. The arrival time of the entrant, denoted
TB P T∆, is a random variable. If firm B has not arrived by t, the probability that firm B
will arrive next period is given by 1 ´ e´λ∆, where λ P p0,8q. Hence TB{∆ is geometrically
distributed with success rate 1´ e´λ∆ (and, in the limit, TB is exponentially distributed with
10Since hiring is irreversible, we can think of w as the net present value of the worker’s future income stream.
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parameter λ). Informational frictions can prevent A from observing B’s arrival. Specifically,
B’s arrival is concealed from A with probability β P p0, 1q and observed by A with probability
1´ β.11 For all t, define the random variable st taking a value in ts0, s
1, s2u, such that st “ s0
if B has not yet arrived by t (that is, if TB ą t), st “ s
1 if B’s arrival was unobserved by A,
and st “ s
2 if B’s arrival was observed by A. Note that by construction firm A only observes
whether st P ts0, s
1u or st “ s
2. We assume on the contrary that the worker and firm B
observe st. With a slight abuse of terminology, we will refer to st as the state.
Timing. The timing within period rt, t`∆q is as follows:
• if st “ s0: firm A makes an offer; the worker then chooses whether to accept or reject
the offer;
• if st “ s1: firm A makes an offer which is observed by B; B then makes a counter-offer
and the worker chooses whether to accept one offer or to reject both;
• if st “ s2: A and B simultaneously make an offer; the worker then chooses whether to
accept one offer or to reject both.
The game ends the instant the worker accepts an offer from one of the two firms (at which
point payoffs are realized).
Strategies and Equilibrium. We focus on pure stationary strategies. Specifically, a strat-
egy for A specifies a mapping wAppt, ts0, s
1uq representing the wage offer as a function of
pt when the state belongs to ts0, s
1u and a mapping wAppt, s
2q representing the wage offer
in state s2.12 Similarly, a strategy for B specifies a mapping wBppt, wA, s
1q representing the
counter-offer in state s1 as a function of pt and firm A’s current offer wA, and a mapping
wBppt, s
2q representing the wage offer in state s2. A strategy for the worker is a mapping
d : rp0, 1sˆts0, s
1, s2uˆR2 Ñ tA,B,Hu, indicating which offer to accept (if any) as a function
of pt, the state, and current wage offers. To simplify the exposition we assume that both firms
offer ´c whenever pt “ 0, which the worker always rejects. By (1), this enables us to focus on
strategies defined over pt P rp0, 1s only.
Our equilibrium concept is sequential equilibrium in pure stationary strategies. Henceforth,
we refer to such sequential equilibria as equilibria for short.
11The observability of B is drawn once and for all, for simplicity.
12As we make clear later, as long as st P ts0, s
1u, firm A’s beliefs concerning st are payoff-irrelevant for A.
We therefore ignore them without loss of generality.
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Remark 1. All results in the paper continue to hold in the limit as ∆ Ñ 0 if, instead of
public learning, firm A privately learned about ω by observing the worker’s slip-ups while firm
B learned about talent through the wage offers of the incumbent.
4 Preliminary Analysis
We briefly analyze the social planner’s problem, and use the planner’s value function in order
to construct a wage function playing a key role in the rest of the paper. The details of all
derivations in this section are in Appendix B.
Let V∆ppq, denote the planner’s value function given initial belief p and period length ∆. If
ω “ L then not hiring the worker is the socially optimal decision. The planner’s problem thus
reduces to an optimal stopping problem, in which the stopping time determines the instant
at which to hire the worker (at either one of the two firms) conditional on no slip-up having

















´ Spptq ă 0 if t ě t
˚
∆.
Intuitively, the marginal benefit to waiting an additional period of length ∆ is positive if and
only if t ă t˚∆. In order to make the bargaining problem non-trivial, we will assume throughout
that t˚∆ ą 0. To shorten notation, henceforth let p
˚
∆ denote the belief at time t
˚
∆ conditional
on no slip-up having occurred before that time.









pt ` p1´ ptqe
´ηpt˚∆´tq
˘
Spp˚∆q if t ă t
˚
∆
Spptq if t ě t
˚
∆.
We next use the planner’s value function in order to construct an auxiliary wage function
ŵ∆ppq. Henceforth, with a slight abuse of notation, we denote by Ep the expected value given
13The existence and uniqueness of the optimal stopping time is proven in the appendix.
14We ignore the case in which the equality holds at exactly t˚∆ since such cases are knife-edge.
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initial belief p. With this notation,
ŵ∆ppq :“ Epre´rT̂V∆ppT̂ qs, (2)
where T̂ {∆ is geometrically distributed with success rate p1´βqp1´e´λ∆q. The lemma below
lists the basic properties of ŵ∆p¨q.
Lemma 1. The following properties hold:
1. ŵ∆ppq ă V∆ppq for all p ą 0,
2. ŵ∆ppq is an increasing function of p,
3. ŵ∆p¨q is increasing in λ and decreasing in β,
4. there exists t7∆ such that, whenever pt ą 0:
15
(a) ŵ∆pptq ą Spptq if t ă t
7
∆,
(b) ŵ∆pptq ă Spptq if t ě t
7
∆.
Properties 1-3 are easily obtained from definition (2). Property 4 will enable us to simplify
the exposition by assuming henceforth that t7∆ “ 0. Extending all of our results to 0 ă t
7
∆ is
straightforward, but makes the statement of some results unnecessarily tedious. The functions
Sppq, V ppq :“ lim∆Ñ0 V∆ppq and ŵppq :“ lim∆Ñ0 ŵ∆ppq are all illustrated in Figure 1. We
also indicate the values p7 :“ lim∆Ñ0 p
7
∆ and p
˚ :“ lim∆Ñ0 p
˚
∆. The next lemma provides an
alternative representation of the function ŵ∆ppq.
Lemma 2. If T {∆ is geometrically distributed with success rate p1´ e´λ∆q then
ŵ∆ppq “ Epre´rT p1´ βqV∆ppT q ` e´rT βŵ∆ppT qs. (3)
Equation (3) enables us to view ŵ∆ppq as the value of a lottery paying out V∆p¨q with
probability p1 ´ βq and paying out ŵ∆p¨q with probability β, at a random time distributed
like the random arrival time TB of the entrant. This observation will be the cornerstone of
the benchmark equilibrium construction we undertake in the next subsection.



















5 Two Simple Equilibria
In this section we examine two salient equilibria. The insights developed in this section will
help us draw the contour of the core analysis undertaken in the subsequent section. The proofs
for this section are in Appendix C.
5.1 Benchmark Equilibrium
The aim in this subsection is to construct an equilibrium in which:
• as long as pt ą 0 each firm offers ŵ∆pptq whenever the state belongs to ts0, s1u, and the
entire surplus Spptq in state s
2,
• in state s0 the worker rejects all offers until a cutoff time t̂∆ ď t˚∆,
• in state s1 the worker accepts an offer immediately, and in state s2 the worker rejects all
offers until t˚∆.
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We denote this equilibrium by E∆ and call it the benchmark equilibrium. The cutoff time






e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
ą Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ă t̂∆
Et
“
e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
ă Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ě t̂∆.
Henceforth, let p̂∆ denote the belief at the time t̂∆ conditional on no slip-up having occurred
before that time. Observe that t̂∆ is the optimal stopping time of a social planner with
(virtual) surplus S ´ ŵ∆ and discount rate r ` λ, that is,




e´pr`λqT maxt0, SppT q ´ ŵ∆ppT qu
‰
.
One shows that t̂∆ ď t
˚
∆, with strict inequality when ∆ ą 0 is sufficiently small. Again, to
make the problem interesting, we will assume throughout that t̂∆ ą 0.
17









This is the reservation wage given that, in all future periods, only wages corresponding to ŵp¨q
are offered as long as pt ą 0. Note that, by the definition of ŵ∆p¨q: w∆ppt, s
1q ă ŵ∆pptq for all
pt ą 0. We can now state this subsection’s result.
Proposition 1. The following strategy profile, E∆, constitutes an equilibrium:18
• wAppt, s2q “ Spptq and wAppt, ts0, s1uq “ ŵ∆pptq.









1q,min twA, Spptquu if t ě t
˚
∆.
16The existence of such a t̂∆ is an immediate consequence of Corollary 1 in the appendix. We rule out the
non-generic case in which equality occurs at time t̂∆.
17When t̂∆ “ 0, trade will take place without delay. When t̂∆ ą 0, trade will inevitably exhibit delay in all
equilibria.
18Recall that for expositional simplicity strategies are defined over pt P rp0, 1s only, that is, conditional on
no slip-up having occurred.
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•
dppt, s0, wAq “
#
A if t ă t̂∆ and wA ą ŵ∆pptq, or t ě t̂∆ and wA ě ŵ∆pptq
H otherwise
dppt, s






A if wA ą wB ě w∆ppt, s
1q, or wA ě w∆ppt, s
1q ą wB










A if wA ě wB ě V∆pptq
B if wB ą wA ě V∆pptq
H otherwise.19
Below, we sketch the main arguments showing that these strategies comprise an equi-
librium. When the state is s2, the firms compete a la Bertrand. In this case, the worker
commands the entire surplus and waiting until t˚∆ is therefore the worker’s optimal policy.
By construction, the worker’s reservation wage in the state s1 is equal to w∆ppt, s
1q. Consider
next the state s0, and let w∆ppt, s0q denote the worker’s reservation wage as a function of pt
in that state.20 We can show that if the worker rejects an offer at time t, she can then do no
better than to wait for B in the hope that the entrant’s arrival will be observed by A, and
to fall back on ŵ∆ppTBq if this turns out not to be the case. As this policy yields expected
discounted payoff ŵ∆pptq (see (3)), we obtain w∆ppt, s0q “ ŵ∆pptq. Thus, with the worker’s
strategy as in the statement of the proposition, the worker never accepts an offer below her
reservation wage. The worker’s strategy is thus a best response.
We next argue that each firm behaves optimally. Consider first firm B in state s1. As





is accepted by the
worker, in this case the best response of B is to match the offer from A. Any offer of
wA ă w∆ppt, s
1q on the other hand is rejected by the worker. In this case, the best re-
sponse of B is to instantly hire the worker at a wage of w∆ppt, s
1q if and only if Spptq ´
w∆ppt, s
1q ě e´r∆Et rmaxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ w∆ppt`∆, s1qus, which, for ∆ sufficiently small, happens
exactly when t ě t˚∆ .
19In the defined equilibrium, when wA “ wB ě V∆pptq in state s
2, it does not matter which offer the worker
accepts.
20The worker’s reservation wage is defined as the sup of the worker’s expected discounted payoff assuming
that the worker rejects the current offer(s).
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Consider now firm A. In state s1, any offer less than Spptq is matched by B; this implies that
the only way A can hire the worker is by offering more than the full surplus. Consequently,
to show that firm A’s policy is optimal when the state belongs to ts0, s
1u, it is enough to show
that it is optimal conditional on the state s0. Since wppt, s0q “ ŵpptq, firm A’s problem in the
state s0 is akin to that of the social planner’s with (virtual) surplus S ´ ŵ and discount rate
r ` λ. By a previous remark, firm A’s optimal policy is therefore to hire the worker at the
cutoff time t̂∆.
5.2 Efficient Equilibrium
The benchmark equilibrium of the previous subsection is open to criticism since firm A offers
ŵ∆pptq at all times t ă t̂∆ although the firm strictly prefers to wait until t̂∆ is reached before
hiring. Equilibrium is sustained only by the belief that the worker will in fact reject all offers
from A before t̂∆ is reached. Moreover, the promise of receiving offers ŵ∆pptq at all future
dates (conditional on no slip-up) raises the worker’s current reservation wage, which in turn
lowers the incumbent’s maximum share of the surplus. One can argue that a more natural
equilibrium would therefore entail A offering a wage equal to 0 until the time at which it
actually wants to hire the worker. The next proposition characterizes such an equilibrium,
which, as we show in Section 6, turns out to be the most efficient equilibrium. Before stating
the result, define for the rest of this subsection:







ŵ∆ppt̂∆q ` p1´ βqp1´ e
´λpt̂∆´tqqV∆ppt̂∆q
ı














if t ě t̂∆.
Note that w∆ppt, s
1q ă w∆ppt, s0q for all pt ą 0.
Proposition 2. The following strategy profile, E˚∆, constitutes an equilibrium:





0 if t ă t̂∆
ŵ∆pptq if t ě t̂∆.
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dppt, s0, wAq “
#
A if wA ě w∆ppt, s0q
H otherwise
dppt, s






A if wA ą wB ě w∆ppt, s
1q, or wA ě w∆ppt, s
1q ą wB













A if wA ě wB ě V∆pptq
B if wB ą wA ě V∆pptq
H otherwise.
We henceforth refer to the equilibrum strategy profile E˚∆ in the statement of Proposition
2 as the efficient equilibrium. On the equilibrium path, each firm offers 0 until the cutoff
time t̂∆, at which point each firm offers ŵ∆pptq when the state belongs to ts0, s
1u and the
entire surplus in state s2. Since E˚∆ coincides with E∆ whenever pt ě p̂∆, all that we need to
prove is that neither firm has a profitable deviation for pt ă p̂∆. The difficulty is that, in E˚∆,
the worker’s reservation wage (in state s0) is strictly less than ŵ∆pptq for all pt ă p̂∆ (which
was the reservation wage in E∆). Consequently, the share of surplus which firms can extract
prior to the cutoff time t̂∆ is higher in E˚∆ than in E∆. We show that, in spite of this remark,
waiting until t̂∆ in order to hire the worker for a wage ŵ∆pp̂∆q yields each firm higher expected
discounted payoff than offering the worker her reservation wage at any time before t̂∆.
6 Equilibrium Properties
In the previous section we constructed two equilibria. In both equilibria: (a) if the worker is
hired by A, it is at time t̂∆ for a wage ŵpp̂∆q; (b) following the observed arrival of the entrant
before t̂∆, the worker is hired at time t
˚
∆ for a wage Spp
˚
∆q (conditional on no slip-up occurring
before then); (c) following the unobserved arrival of the entrant, the worker is hired at time
t̂∆ at the latest. In the following theorem we show that these properties are common to all
equilibria. The proofs for this section are in Appendix D.
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Theorem 1. In any equilibrium, conditional on no slip-up occurring before the cutoff time
t̂∆:
1. firm A obtains a positive surplus if and only if firm B arrives after t̂∆;
2. if firm B arrives after t̂∆, firm A hires the worker at time t̂∆ for a wage ŵ∆pp̂∆q;
3. if firm B arrives before t̂∆ and the entrant’s arrival is unobserved, it hires the worker at
some time t ď t̂∆.
21
In view of Theorem 1, characterizing the cutoff time t̂∆ will enable us to quantify the
extent of unraveling occurring in all equilibria. Our focus in the rest of this section is on
the welfare implications of the theorem. First, all equilibria are payoff-equivalent for the
incumbent since, no matter the equilibrium, A hires the worker at time t̂∆ and pays the wage
ŵ∆pp̂∆q if TB ą t̂∆, and otherwise A does not obtain any surplus as it either competes a la
Bertrand or loses the worker to the entrant. However, all equilibria are not payoff-equivalent
for the worker, nor for the entrant. In equilibrium E∆ for instance, the worker is offered ŵ∆pptq
or more for all t (as long as no slip-up has occured). This feature enables the worker to secure
the wage ŵ∆ppTBq at time TB in case the entrant’s arrival is unobserved and occurs before
t̂∆. By contrast, in equilibrium E˚∆ the worker is forced to wait until t̂∆ in order to obtain
ŵ∆pp̂∆q. But the worker would strictly prefer accepting ŵ∆ppTBq at time TB ă t̂∆ since all
upside potential disappears the instant B’s arrival is unobserved. Hence E∆ is better than E˚∆
from the worker’s perspective. By the same token E˚∆ is better than E∆ from the viewpoint
of firm B. To see this, note that whereas competition grows over time from the perspective
of the incumbent, competition is constant from the perspective of the entrant. Consequently,
following an unobserved arrival before t̂∆, firm B would prefer hiring the worker at the later
time t̂∆ rather than immediately. Yet, as argued above, the worker’s reservation wage drops
the instant B’s arrival is unobserved. This forces B to hire the worker as soon as offers from
A are larger than the reservation wage in the state s1. In E˚∆ the latter effect forces B to hire
the worker at time t̂∆; in E∆ it forces B to hire the worker at time TB ă t̂∆.
As it turns out, E˚∆ is firm B’s (resp. the worker’s) most-preferred (resp. least-preferred)
equilibrium, while E∆ is firm B’s (resp. the worker’s) least-preferred (resp. most-preferred)
21At which exact time t ď t̂∆ firm B hires the worker after an unobserved will depend on the equilibrium.
For example, in equilibrium E∆ firm B hired the worker immediately after an unobserved arrival before t̂∆.
In contrast, in equilibrium E˚∆, firm B waited until t̂∆ to hire the worker even if it arrived unobserved well
before t̂∆.
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equilibrium. Finally, observe that in E˚∆ the worker is never hired before the cutoff time t̂∆.
It therefore follows from Theorem 1 that E˚∆ is the most efficient equilibrium. Theorem 2
summarizes all these results.
Theorem 2. The set of equilibria satisfies the following properties:
1. all equilibria are payoff-equivalent for firm A,
2. E˚∆ is firm B’s most-preferred equilibrium and the worker’s least-preferred equilibrium,
3. E∆ is firm B’s least-preferred equilibrium and the worker’s most-preferred equilibrium,
4. E˚∆ is the most efficient equilibrium.
Some additional remarks are worth highlighting. As the worker is never hired later in E∆
than in E˚∆ (and sometimes strictly earlier), notice that “employment” is higher in E∆ than in
E˚∆. By the same token, the average talent of an employed worker is lower in E∆ than in E˚∆.
Note too that in both equilibria talent and wages are non-uniform within and across firms.
We elaborate on these observations in the next section.
7 Comparative Statics
In this section we present various comparative statics results. The proofs for this section are
in Appendix E. For tractability and clarity of graphs, we concentrate on the limit as ∆ Ñ 0.
To this end, define:
V ppq :“ max
Tě0
e´rTEp rmaxt0, SppT qus . (4)
Let t˚ be the solution to (4) given intial belief p0, and let p
˚ denote the belief at time t˚
conditional on slip up. Then, whenever p˚ P p0, 1q, it must satisfy the first-order condition
rSpp˚q “ cp1´ p˚qη.
Next, define p̂ implicitly by











e´rT V ppT q
‰
, (6)
where T is exponentially distributed with intensity p1´ βqλ.
We show in the appendix that V ppq “ lim∆Ñ0 V∆ppq, ŵppq “ lim∆Ñ0 ŵ∆ppq, t̂ “ lim∆Ñ0 t̂∆,
t˚ “ lim∆Ñ0 t
˚
∆, p̂ “ lim∆Ñ0 p̂∆, and p
˚ :“ lim∆Ñ0 p
˚
∆. Consequently, all payoffs in this section
correspond to limiting equilibrium payoffs as ∆ Ñ 0. Unless stated otherwise, our simulations
use the following parameters: η “ b “ c “ λ “ 1, β “ 0.9, r “ 0.1, p0 “ 0.3.
7.1 Informational Frictions and Competition
We explore in this subsection the welfare effects of informational frictions (β) and of changing
the competition (λ). Recall that by Theorem 1 all equilibria have the property that hiring
is never delayed beyond t̂∆. Furthermore, in the efficient equilibrium, hiring is delayed until
exactly t̂∆. Thus, t̂∆ represents the minimal amount of unraveling that could occur in any
equilibrium. The following lemma describes the comparative statics of t̂∆ when ∆ is sufficiently
small as λ and β change.
Lemma 3. The cutoff time t̂ is decreasing in β and non-monotonic in λ. Moreover, t̂ Ñ t˚
whenever one of the following holds: (a) β Ñ 0, (b) λÑ 0, (c) λÑ `8 and β ą 0.22
The intuition behind Lemma 3 is as follows. We noted in the previous section that the
cutoff belief p̂∆ balances the worker and firm A’s collective gain from waiting to learn the
worker’s realized talent versus the loss from delaying hiring in case the worker is in fact
talented. By reducing the worker and firm A’s collective gain from waiting to learn the
worker’s realized talent, increasing β therefore lowers the cutoff belief p̂∆. The impact of λ is
more complicated. On the one hand increasing λ raises the probability of firm B hiring the
worker, which reduces the worker and firm A’s joint incentive to wait. On the other hand, by
Lemma 1, increasing λ augments ŵ∆p¨q and, thereby, raises the worker’s payoff whenever firm
B hires the worker in the state s1. The latter effect enhances the worker and firm A’s gain
from waiting to learn about talent. These countervailing forces suggest the non-monotonicity
22This lemma holds even for ∆ ą 0 except for the statement about λ Ñ `8. When ∆ is bounded away
from zero, even as λ Ñ `8, t̂ remains bounded away from t˚. The reason is in the way we’ve defined the
discrete time game so that in each period a maximum of one offer arrives.
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Figure 2
of t̂ (and hence p̂) in λ. Figure 2 illustrates p̂ as a function of λ; simulations show that p̂ is in
fact quasi-convex in λ.
To highlight the intuition behind the limit results, note that when β “ 0, i.e., absent
informational frictions, the worker extracts all surplus after the arrival of the entrant. The
entrant never receives any surplus. The worker and firm A therefore agree on a contract
at the efficient time. Similarly, when λ “ 0, the entire surplus is trivially captured by the
coalition of firm A and the worker which leads to the efficient outcome. In contrast, if λ
becomes arbitrarily large (and β ą 0), the worker can threaten firm A with extracting the
entire surplus after an observed arrival (which occurs at rate p1´βqλ). Thus, as this intensity
increases to infinity, the worker can capture all surplus and conditional on no arrival will wait
until exactly t˚ to sign a contract with firm A.
The above lemma yields direct implications for social welfare, as seen in the next theo-
rem. As it is the most efficient equilibrium (see Theorem 2) we focus henceforth on equi-
lbrium E˚∆.23 Let Π˚∆i denote player i’s ex-ante expected discounted payoff in equilibrium
E˚∆ and let W ˚∆ denote the ex-ante social welfare, that is, W ˚∆ “ Π˚∆A ` Π˚∆B ` Π˚∆worker.
As before, for tractability, we focus on the limit as ∆ Ñ 0 and so we additionally define






23All of our results would be the same if we focused instead on equilibrium E∆.
19
Theorem 3. (i) W ˚ is decreasing in β, and tends to V pp0q as β Ñ 0. (ii) W
˚ is non-
monotonic in λ, and tends to V pp0q as λ tends to zero or infinity.
The effect of β on social is welfare is straightforward, since increasing β lowers t̂ (see
Lemma 3) and simultaneously raises the relative probability with which the worker is hired at
t̂ rather than t˚ (by increasing the probability that the worker is hired in the state s1 rather
than s2). The effect of λ is more subtle. As long as increasing λ raises t̂ then increasing
λ unambiguously improves social welfare. However, when increasing λ lowers t̂, then social
welfare can be negatively affected. We next analyze the players’ equilibrium expected payoffs.
Proposition 3. W ˚ ą Π˚worker for all λ and W
˚ ą Π˚A for all λ ą 0. Moreover:
1. Π˚worker is increasing in λ, decreasing in β, and W
˚ ´ Π˚worker Ñ 0 as λÑ `8,
2. Π˚A is decreasing in λ, increasing in β, W
˚ ´ Π˚A Ñ 0 as β Ñ 0,
3. Π˚B is non-monotonic in λ.
Figure 3
Figure 3 illustrates Π˚i as a function of λ, and Figure 4 as a function of β, for i P
tA,B,workeru. Combining results from Theorem 3 and Proposition 3 highlights the exis-
tence of a fundamental trade-off between efficiency and inequality: fixing β and varying λ,
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Figure 4
efficiency is attained if and only if either the worker or firm A appropriates the entire surplus.
The logic of the trade-off is as follows. When bargaining power is distributed evenly between
the worker and firm A (which occurs for intermediate values of λ) then B is able to claim a
large part of the surplus. This in turn reduces the worker and firm A’s collective gain from
waiting to learn about talent, increasing unraveling.
The finding that raising λ can hurt firm B is explained by the fact that an increase in λ
raises the worker’s reservation wage in the state s1. Finally, the fact that increasing λ and
decreasing β both worsen the welfare of A while improving the welfare of the worker should
come as no surprise to the reader. Indeed the result is trivial in equilibrium E∆, since ŵ∆p¨q
is decreasing in β and increasing in λ, and the worker is offered ŵ∆pptq at each point in
time whenever the state belongs to ts0, s
1u (conditional on no slip-up having occurred). Note
however that establishing the result in equilibrium E˚∆ requires some care, since whenever the
state belongs to ts0, s
1u the worker is first offered ŵ∆p¨q at time t̂∆ and we saw in Lemma 3
that t̂∆ could increase with the parameter λ. The proof uses an envelope theorem argument.
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7.2 Wages and Average Talent
Next, we examine the distributions of talent and wages within and across firms. As p˚∆ ă 1
and since the worker is never hired passed the belief p˚∆, each firm exhibits a mixture of good
and bad employees (in all equilibria). However, since firm A and firm B hire at different times,
the respective shares of good and bad employees vary across the two firms.
So far, we assumed for expository purposes that (in equilibrium) firm A always hires the
worker in case of an observed arrival. There is also a pure strategy equilibrium in which firm
B always hires the worker. Payoffs are the same in those two equilibria, but the average talent
hired by each firm is affected. For this reason we allow in this subsection for a mixed action
in the case of an observed arrival, in which A and B hire the worker with probability 1
2
each.
The focus, as before, is on the efficient equilibrium E˚∆.
As talent is a binary variable, it is sufficient to examine average talent. At firm A, average
talent is given by


















To see this, note that the probability that TB ď t̂ is 1 ´ e
´λt̂, in which case firm A hires the
worker at the belief p˚ with probability 1
2
p1 ´ βq; starting from p̂, the probability that the
worker does not slip up before hitting p˚ is p̂
p˚
. If TB ą t̂ then firm A hires the worker at the
belief p̂. We find in a similar way that, at firm B, average talent is given by























The intuition behind the latter condition is as follows. Increasing β changes the composition of
workers hired by B, by reducing the fraction of workers hired at the belief p˚ and increasing the
fraction of workers hired early at the belief p̂. By contrast, increasing λ leaves the composition
of workers hired by B unaffected, but transforms the composition of workers hired by A, by
reducing the fraction of workers hired early at the belief p̂ and increasing the fraction of
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Figure 5
workers hired at the belief p˚. The distribution of wages within and across firms is illustrated
in Figure 5, for two values of λ. On the left panel, λ “ 1, and on the right panel λ “ 0.3.
The light blue bars correspond to firm A, and the dark blue bars correspond to firm B. The
fractions of high and low wages at firm B is the same in both panels. However, as λ goes from
0.3 to 1, the fraction of high wages goes from 25% to 81%.
7.3 The Speed of Learning
Lastly, we discuss briefly the effect of η, representing the speed of learning about the worker’s
talent. Observe first that the planner’s value function, V∆ppq, is increasing in η.
24 By (2), it
ensues that ŵ∆ppq is also increasing in η, from which we conclude, using (5), that p̂ increases
with η. Figure 6 illustrates the payoffs as a function of η. Both the worker and firm A benefit
from faster learning. However, increasing η can hurt firm B. This follows from Theorem 1
and the fact that t̂ may decrease with η, leaving less time for the entrant to arrive before the
worker is hired by the incumbent. At the same time, firm B can benefit from a high speed of
learning due to the fact that, since p̂ increases with η, Spp̂q ´ ŵpp̂q must increase with η as
well (by part 4 of Lemma 1).
24If η2 ą η1 and the social planner chooses the cutoff belief p
˚
1 then this belief is reached sooner. That is,




The principal contribution of our paper is to shed light on the link between wage bargaining
and unraveling. We show that informational frictions related to bargaining play a key role in
the extent of unraveling occurring in equilibrium, and that competition alone is not enough to
cause unraveling. Surprisingly, in the presence of informational frictions, the relationship be-
tween competition and unraveling is non-monotonic. Increasing competition at first increases
unraveling, but then decreases unraveling passed a certain point. We also highlight a novel
trade-off between unraveling and inequality: the more equal the division of surplus between
firms and workers, the greater the extent of unraveling.
In order to achieve tractability, we make several modelling assumptions. The bargaining
protocol of our model is very simple, and can only partly capture the complexity of bargaining
occurring in the real world. We also assume that firms are completely symmetric in terms
of payoffs. This allows us to capture the trade-offs that have not been captured by the un-
raveling literature that is mostly concerned with match-specific productivity. Worker-specific
productivity (“talent”) is particularly important in thin speciality markets where we observe
a lot of unraveling. Finally, we assume that contracts are signed once and for all. This is to
24
some extent justified by firms’ efforts to increase switching costs, by e.g., offering subsidies
for homes. Similarly, firms face restrictions in how fast they can fire workers. Nevertheless, it
would be interesting to think about a richer class of contracts in a similar setup.
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A Preliminaries: Single-Crossing Conditions
Before we present the proofs of the paper, we prove a single-crossing result for a class of value
functions that are relevant in many proofs. The following lemma provides sufficient conditions
under which such a value function satisfies a single-crossing condition.
To this end, let us define a class of continuations values given a function gppq ě 0 by:
W∆ppt, gq :“ e
´r∆Et
“




pβgppt`∆q ` p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆qq
‰
.
Consider a decision maker who can either take Spptq today or wait for a period and obtain
W∆ppt, gq. Then, the following lemma provides sufficient conditions under which there is a
unique optimal stopping time t̄∆ at which the decision maker should take Spptq.
Lemma 4. Suppose that g : p0, 1q Ñ r0,`8q with gp0q “ 0 satisfies the following inequalities








0 ă W∆ppt, gq ´ Spptq if t ă t̄∆,
0 ą W∆ppt, gq ´ Spptq if t ě t̄∆.
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Proof: Let Mpptq :“ W∆ppt, gq ´ Sppq denote the marginal benefit to waiting an additional












pmaxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ βgppt`∆q ´ p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆qq
‰
.
First note that for all t ě t˚∆, Y pptq ą 0 ě Xpptq which then implies that Mpptq ă 0. Thus
for the theorem, it is sufficient to show that if t ă t˚∆ and Mpptq ď 0, then Mppt`∆q ă 0. Note
that if t ` ∆ ě t˚∆, we are already done. Thus let us assume that t ă t ` ∆ ă t
˚
∆. Because
















25We ignore the case in which equality holds at exactly t̄∆ since this occurs only in knife-edge cases.
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Combining the above inequalities, we obtain:
p1´ e´λ∆qEt`∆ rmaxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ βgppt`∆q ´ p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆qs ă Y ppt`∆q.
Since we assumed that Mpptq ď 0, 0 ă Xpptq ď Y pptq, which means that
Et rmaxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ βgppt`∆q ´ p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆qs ą 0.
This implies that
Y pptq ă p1´ e
´λ∆
qEt rmaxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ βgppt`∆q ´ p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆qs ă Y ppt`∆q.
Furthermore as we will see in Section B, we know that Xppt`∆q ă Xpptq . Combining these
inequalities, we obtain:
Mppt`∆q “ Xppt`∆q ´ Y ppt`∆q ă Xpptq ´ Y pptq “Mpptq ď 0.

B Proofs of Section 4














´ Spptq “ e
´r∆
`
pt ` p1´ ptqe
´η∆
˘
ppb` cqpt`∆ ´ cq ´ Spptq
“ e´r∆
`




“ ´pb` cqptp1´ e
´r∆
q ` cr1´ e´r∆
`





















´ Spptq ă 0 if t ě t
˚
∆.
Furthermore, given the above, it is straightforward to show that indeed such a t˚∆ is the unique
maximizer of the social planner’s problem.










Epre´rTV∆ppT qs ą Epre´rT̂V∆ppT̂ qs “ ŵ∆ppq.
2. V∆ppq is increasing in p and, for any t, pt is increasing in the initial belief p0. Thus,
ŵ∆ppq given by (2) is increasing in p.
3. Immediate from (2).
4. First note that for all τ ě t˚∆. Sppτ q “ V∆ppτ q and therefore, Spptq ą ŵ∆pptq for all
t ě t˚∆. Thus to prove the claim, it suffices to show that if Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆q ă 0 at time
t`∆ then Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ă 0 for t ă t`∆ ă t
˚




































Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ă e
´r∆
`
pt ` p1´ ptqe
´η∆
˘
pSppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qq ă 0.
































As k Ñ 8 this is equivalent to (3). 
C Proofs of Section 5
Before proving Proposition 1, we prove an auxiliary corollary of Lemma 4 with g “ ŵ∆.






e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
ą Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ă t̂∆
Et
“
e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
ă Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ě t̂∆.









e´pr`λqpτ´tq maxt0, Sppτ q ´ ŵ∆ppτ qu
‰
.


















Furthermore we already know from Lemma 1 that ŵ∆pptq ď V∆pptq. Thus by substituting




Spptq ă W∆ppt, ŵ∆q if t ă t̂∆,
Spptq ą W∆ppt, ŵ∆q if t ě t̂∆.
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Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ă W∆ppt, ŵ∆q ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ă t̂∆,
Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ą W∆ppt, ŵ∆q ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ě t̂∆.
But note that
W∆ppt, ŵ∆q ´ ŵ∆pptq “ e
´pr`λq∆Et rmaxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qus .




Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ă e
´pr`λq∆Et
“
e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
if t ă t̂∆,
Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ą e
´pr`λq∆Et
“
e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
if t ě t̂∆.













Proof of Proposition 1: We prove that E∆ is an equilibrium. We first show that the
worker’s strategy is optimal given firms’ strategies.
1. st “ s
2: When st “ s
2 the worker can guarantee itself V∆pptq given both firms offer
Spptq in all future periods. This implies that the worker’s best response is to accept
maxtwA, wBu if and only if maxtwA, wBu ě V∆pptq.
2. st “ s



































Since in state s1, all offers at times τ “ t`1, t`2, . . . are ŵ∆ppτ q by both firms, the best
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payoff that the worker can obtain from waiting at least one period is indeed w∆ppt, s
1q.
As a result, the optimal strategy of the worker is to accept maxtwA, wBu if and only if
maxtwA, wBu ě w∆ppt, s
1q.
3. st “ s0: Note that after the state changes to sτ “ s
1, the worker’s continuation value at
time τ is ŵ∆ppτ q. Similarly, if the state changes to sτ “ s
2 at time τ , then the worker’s
continuation value at time τ is V∆ppτ q. By the construction of ŵ∆, given any stopping





´rτ ŵ∆ppτ q ` 1pτ ě T1qe
´rT1 pβŵ∆ppT1q ` p1´ βqV∆ppT1qq
‰
where T1 is a random time that is geometrically distributed with success rate p1´e
´λ∆q.
As a result, ŵ∆pptq is exactly the maximum continuation value that the worker can
obtain from rejecting an offer at time t and waiting for the optimal time to accept.
Thus the worker’s best response is indeed the worker strategy specified by E∆.
Next we show that firm A’s strategy is a best response to firm B and worker’s strategies:
1. st “ s
2: Here B offers Spptq. Thus A cannot achieve strictly positive expected payoff
and offering Spptq is a weak best response.
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2. st P ts0, s
1u: Observe first that if st “ s
1 the only way A can hire the worker is by offering
more than the total surplus because B always matches its offer. Hence if st P ts0, s
1u,
firm A maximizes its payoff conditional on st “ s0. By Corollary 1,
Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ă e
´pr`λqpt̂∆´tqEt
“
maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
‰
for all t ă t̂∆, (8)
Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ą e
´pr`λqps´tqEt rmax t0, Sppsq ´ ŵ∆ppsqus for all s ą t ě t̂∆. (9)
Suppose first that t ă t̂∆. In this case, by playing the proposed equilibrium strategy,





0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆q
(‰
.
A one-stage deviation of offering wA ă ŵ∆pptq gives exactly the same payoff while a
26Recall that in state st “ s
2, both firms simultaneously make an offer.
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one-stage deviation of wA ą ŵ∆pptq gives a payoff of
Spptq ´ wA ă Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ă e
´pr`λqpt̂∆´tqEt
“
maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
‰
where the second inequality follows from (8). Thus the offer of ŵ∆pptq is optimal for
firm A.
Suppose next that t ě t̂∆. Then note that by playing its equilibrium strategy, firm A
receives a payoff of Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq. On the other hand, offering wA ą ŵ∆pptq is clearly




e´pr`λqps´tqEt rmax t0, Sppsq ´ ŵ∆ppsqus ă Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq,
where the inequality follows from (9). Thus we conclude that firm A’s strategy is indeed
a best response.
Lastly, we show that B’s strategy is a best response to the other players’ strategies.
1. st “ s
2: The arguments are the same that we used for firm A.
2. st “ s
1: Suppose that firm A has made an offer of wA at time t. If wA ě w∆ppt, s
1q, it
is clear that the best response is to offer mintSpptq, wAu. Suppose on the contrary that
wA ă w∆ppt, s
1q. Assume first that t ă t˚∆. Offering any wage wB ă w∆ppt, s
1q leads to
a payoff of Et
“
e´r∆pmaxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qq
‰
. By offering wB ě w∆ppt, s
1q, leads
to a payoff of
Spptq ´ wB ď Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s
1






e´r∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
.
Thus in this scenario, it is a best response for firm B to offer wB “ wA.
Finally suppose that t ě t˚∆. If wA ă w∆ppt, s
1q, then offering the wage w∆ppt, s
1q leads
to payoff of Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s
1q. Clearly offering wB ą w∆ppt, s
1q is suboptimal while
offering wB ă w∆ppt, s
1q leads to a payoff of
Et
“
e´r∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
ă Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s
1
q.
Thus the offer of w∆ppt, s
1q is a best response.
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
Proof of Proposition 2: Since E˚∆ coincides with E∆ at all times t ě t̂∆, it remains to show
incentive compatibility of strategies at times t ă t̂∆. Thus throughout the remainder of the
proof, we will restrict attention to t ă t̂∆ ď t
˚








1q if t ă t̂∆
ŵ∆pptq if t ě t̂∆,
and w∆p0, s
1q “ 0. Note that w∆ppt, s
1q represents the continuation value to the worker at
time t conditional on the state s1. At all times t ě t̂∆, w∆ppt, s
1q ą w∆ppt, s
1q since taking an
offer of ŵ∆pptq at time t is strictly better than waiting until time t ` ∆ to take the offer of
ŵ∆ppt`∆q.
We first show that the worker’s strategy is optimal given firms’ strategies.
1. st “ s
2: When st “ s
2, the worker can guarantee itself V∆pptq given that both firms offer
Spptq in all future periods. This implies that the worker’s best response is to accept
maxtwA, wBu if and only if maxtwA, wBu ě V∆pptq.
2. st “ s
1: At all times τ ă t̂∆, offers of both firms are 0 in state s
1. Thus, the most that








Thus, the worker’s optimal strategy is to accept maxtwA, wBu if and only if maxtwA, wBu ě
w∆ppt, s
1q.
3. st “ s0: Note that if the state changes to s
1 at time τ ă t̂∆, then the worker’s continu-
ation payoff is w∆ppt, s
1q. Similarly, if the state changes to s2 at time τ ă t̂∆, then the
worker’s continuation payoff at time τ is V∆pptq. As a result, the worker’s continuation















which is exactly w∆ppt, s0q. Thus, the worker’s optimal strategy is to accept wA if and
only if wA ě w∆ppt, s0q.
35
We now show that firm A’s strategy is optimal given the worker and firm B’s strategies.
1. st “ s
2: Here B offers Spptq. Thus A cannot achieve strictly positive expected payoff
and offering Spptq is a weak best response.
2. st P ts0, s
1u: As in the analysis of equilibrium E∆, it is sufficient to condition on the state
s0. Since t ă t̂∆, the equilibrium strategy of firm A is to offer 0. Playing the equilibrium
strategy thus results in a payoff to firm A of
Et
”
e´pr`λqpt̂∆´tq maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
ı
.
A one-stage deviation to any offer wA ă w∆ppt, s0q results in exactly the same payoff
while a one-stage deviation to an offer wA ě w∆ppt, s0q yields in a payoff of
Spptq ´ wA ď Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s0q.
To prove that Spptq ´w∆ppt, s0q ď Et
”
e´pr`λqpt̂∆´tq maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
ı
, first ob-
serve that for all τ ,













W∆ppτ , w∆p¨, s
1qq ´ Sppτ q ą 0 if τ ă t̄∆,
W∆ppτ , w∆p¨, s
1qq ´ Sppτ q ă 0 if τ ě t̄∆.
First note that t̄∆ ď t̂∆ since for all τ ě t̄∆, w∆ppτ , s0q “ ŵ∆ppτ q. Furthermore, for
τ “ t̂∆ ´∆,
W∆ppt̂∆´∆, w∆p¨, s0qq “ W∆ppt̂∆´∆, ŵ∆q,
which implies that W∆ppτ , w∆p¨, s0qq ´ Sppτ q ą 0. Thus, t̄∆ “ t̂∆.
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Given this, note that
Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s0q ă W∆ppt, w∆p¨, s
1
qq ´ w∆ppt, s0q
“ Et
“
e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ w∆ppt`∆, s0qu
‰
ă ¨ ¨ ¨ ă Et
”
e´pr`λqpt̂∆´tq maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
ı
.
Finally we show that firm B’s strategy is optimal.
1. st “ s
2: The argument here is the same as for Firm A.
2. st “ s
1: Suppose that wA ě w∆ppt, s
1q. Then it is clear that the best response is
mintwA, Spptqu. Suppose instead that wA ă w∆ppt, s
1q. By playing the equilibrium
strategy, firm B obtains a payoff of:
Et
”
e´rpt̂∆´tq maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
ı
.
Note that a one-stage deviation of offering wB ă w∆ppt, s
1q yields the same payoff. Any
offer wB ě w∆ppt, s
1q yields a payoff of:
Spptq ´ wB ď Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s
1






e´rpt̂∆´tq maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
ı
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that t ă t̂∆ ď t
˚
∆. As a result, an offer of
mintwA, Spptqu is optimal for firm B.

D Proofs of Section 6
Fix any equilibrium. Let us define the following continuation values. Given any equilibrium,
let w∆ppt, sq denote the worker’s continuation value at time t conditional on no slip ups and
state s. Similarly, let w∆ppt, sq be the worker’s continuation value at time t conditional on
state s (conditional on no slip-up having occurred before that time) to rejecting all offers at
time t and playing his equilibrium strategy from time t ` ∆ on. Because the continuation
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values are associated with an equilibrium, clearly, for all s, w∆ppt, sq ě w∆ppt, sq. Since after
a breakdown, the belief stays at 0 forever, the continuation values are such that for all s,
w∆p0, sq “ w∆p0, sq “ 0.
We first begin with lemmas that establish continuation values for the players in states s2
and s1.
Lemma 5. In any equilibrium, for all t, w∆ppt, s
2q “ V∆pptq. Consequently, at any time t
conditional on state s2, both firms obtain a continuation value of 0.
Proof: Consider any time t ě t˚∆. Suppose by contradiction that w∆ppt, s
2q ă V∆pptq. Note
that w∆ppt, s
2q ě w∆ppt, s





qu ą w∆ppt, s
2
q,
in which case, maxtwAppt, s
2q, wBppt, s
2qu “ w∆ppt, s
2q ă Spptq “ V∆pptq. But in this scenario,
at least one firm has an incentive to offer maxtwAppt, s
2q, wBppt, s
2qu ` ε for ε ą 0 sufficiently






qu ď w∆ppt, s
2
q,
so that w∆ppt, s
2q “ w∆ppt, s
2q. Then the worker will indeed accept all offers strictly above
w∆ppt, s
2q. Thus, either firm by offering w∆ppt, s
2q`ε will obtain a payoff of Spptq´w∆ppt, s
2q´
ε. On the other hand, by waiting until at least t `∆, the maximum payoff that either firm
will obtain would be
e´r∆Et rV∆ppτ q ´ w∆ppτ , s2qs
since the firm receives at most the residual of the surplus that is not captured by the worker.
But
e´r∆Et rV∆ppt`∆q ´ w∆ppt`∆, s2qs “ e´r∆Et rSppt`∆s ´ w∆ppt, s2q ă Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s2q ´ ε
for ε ą 0 sufficiently small. This contradicts the optimality of the firms’ strategies. Thus, we
have shown that at all times t ě t˚∆, w∆ppt, s
2q “ V∆pptq. Clearly, this leaves both firms with
zero surplus.
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by rejecting all offers until t˚∆. Since this is the maximum possible payoff that the worker can
obtain, this is indeed his equilibrium continuation value. Again, this leaves both firms with
continuation payoffs of 0. 
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium, if at time t, the state is st “ s
1, then firm A’s continuation
value is 0.
Proof: Consider any time t at state st “ s
1. Suppose that the wage offered at time t and
state st “ s
1 is wA.
1. wA ě Spptq: In this case, since Spptq ą ŵ∆pptq ě w∆ppt, s
1q ě w∆ppt, s
1q, the worker will
accept one of the offers. But then firm A receives a payoff of 0 in this case.
2. wA ă Spptq: Suppose by way of contradiction that the worker accepts firm A’s offer. Let
wB be the counteroffer of firm B to wA in equilibrium. Then wA ě maxtwB, w∆ppt, s
1qu.
In this case, firm B receives a payoff of 0 by offering wB. However, by offering wA ` ε,
he receives a payoff of Spptq´wA´ε. Clearly the latter is strictly positive when ε ą 0 is
sufficiently small, yielding a contradiction. Thus we have shown that all times in state
s1, either the worker accepts firm B’s offer or no hiring occurs.
As a result, the continuation payoff of firm A after state s1 must be exactly zero at all times
in any equilibrium. 
We also prove the following lemmas that establish upper bounds on continuation values of
the worker in states s0, s
1 in any equilibrium.
Lemma 7. For all t, w∆ppt, s
1q ď w∆ppt, s0q.
Proof: Note that by Lemma 5, the continuation value to the worker at time t at state st “ s
2
is V∆pptq. Thus, at time t in state st “ s0, by waiting a period, the worker can guarantee





























When the state is s1, firm B will never offer a wage strictly greater than
maxtw∆ppt, s0q, e
´r∆Et rw∆ppt`∆, s1qsu
since all such offers will be accepted. Therefore, we have the following bound:
w∆ppt, s
1
q ď maxtw∆ppt, s0q, e
´r∆Et rw∆ppt`∆, s1qsu.
Suppose by way of contradiction that w∆ppt, s
1q ą w∆ppt, s0q. In this case, using (10) and
the fact that w∆ppt`∆, s
1q ď V∆ppτ q, we must have
0 ă w∆ppt, s
1
q ´ w∆ppt, s0q ď e
´r∆Et rw∆ppt`∆, s1qs ´ w∆ppt, s0q
ď e´pr`λq∆
`





q ´ w∆ppt`∆, s0qs .
Iterating this argument, we see that for all k “ 1, 2, . . .,
0 ă w∆ppt, s
1
q ´ w∆ppt, s0q ă e
´pr`λqk∆
`





q ´ w∆ppt`k∆, s0qs .
But the latter converges to zero as k Ñ 0 which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 8. In any equilibrium, w∆ppt, s
1q, w∆ppt, s0q ď ŵ∆pptq.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary equilibrium. Because w∆ppt, s
1q ď w∆ppt, s0q by Lemma 7, it
suffices to prove that w∆ppt, s0q ď ŵ∆pptq.
Using the same argument as in the first part of the proof of Lemma 7,









q ` p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆q
˘
ı
Moreover, consider firm A’s optimal strategy. Since after states s1, s2, its continuation value
is zero, in choosing its best response, it is without loss of generality to condition on the event
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As a result, firm A will never offer a wage wA strictly above this quantity. Together with the
inequality above, this implies that









q ` p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆q
˘‰
.
Using the fact that w∆ppt`∆, s
1q ď w∆ppt`∆, s0q, we obtain:

















Thus, using the recursive definition of ŵ∆ given in (7),









Et rw∆ppt`∆, s0q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qs
Iterating, we obtain for all k “ 1, 2, . . .,








˘k Et rw∆ppt`k∆, s0q ´ ŵ∆ppt`k∆qs .
The right hand side converges to zero as k Ñ 8, which implies that w∆ppt, s0q ď ŵpptq. 
D.1 Proof of Theorem 1
D.1.1 Equilibrium Behavior at t ě t̂∆
We first analyze the equilibrium behavior at t ě t̂∆.
Lemma 9. At all times t ě t̂∆, conditional on no slip-ups and st “ s0, the worker accepts
the equilibrium offered wage of firm A with probability one.




































Otherwise, an agreement would have to occur at time t at the wage w∆ppt, s0q. However in
















which means that there exists some ε ą 0 such that the worker will still accept w∆ppt, s0q ´ ε
with probability one. But this contradicts the fact that firm A is best responding.
Given the above inequality, and using (7), we then have:









Et rŵ∆ppt`∆q ´ w∆ppt`∆, s0qs
ě e´pr`λq∆Et rŵ∆ppt`∆q ´ w∆ppt`∆, s0qs ,
where the second inequality follows from Lemma 8. Furthermore, by the definition of t̂∆,
Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq ą e
´pr`λq∆Et rmaxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qs .
Adding these inequalities, we have:
Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s0q ą e
´pr`λq∆Et rmaxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ w∆ppt`∆, s0qs .
Iterating, we obtain for all k “ 1, 2, . . .,
Spptq ´ w∆ppt, s0q ą e
´pr`λqk∆Et rmaxt0, St`k∆u ´ w∆ppt`k∆, s0qs .
But this implies that an agreement must occur at time t. 
Given the above, equilibria take a very simple structure at all times t ě t̂∆. Further-
more note that if acceptance occurs at all such times, then the continuation value at time t
conditional on an unobserved arrival by firm B is exactly equal to the continuation value at
time t conditional on no arrivals by firm B. This observation allows us to obtain the following
proposition.
Lemma 10. At all times t ě t̂∆, conditional on no slip ups and no arrival by firm B, firm A
hires the worker at the wage ŵ∆pptq with probability one.
Proof: We will show that indeed w∆ppt, s0q “ ŵ∆pptq for all t ě t̂∆. To see this note that
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using the same argument for the first part of proof of the previous lemma,
















Furthermore, since we know by the previous lemma that agreement must be reached at period
















Therefore, for all t,
















But note that ŵ∆ satisfies the same difference equation.
Therefore we have:









Et rw∆ppt`∆, s0q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qs
Iterating, we have for all k “ 1, 2, . . .,








˘k Et rw∆ppt`k∆, s0q ´ ŵ∆ppt`k∆qs .
This implies that w∆ppt, s0q ´ ŵ∆pptq “ 0 since otherwise,
lim
kÑ8
|w∆ppt`k∆, s0q ´ ŵ∆ppt`k∆q| “ `8.
This concludes the proof. 
D.1.2 Equilibrium Behavior at t ă t̂∆
We will show that at all such times, firm A does not hire the worker.
Lemma 11. Suppose that t ă t̂∆. Then in any equilibrium, conditional on no slip-ups and
no arrivals by firm B, the offered wage of firm A is rejected with probability one.













if t ă t̂∆
ŵ∆pptq if t ě t̂∆.
Furthermore, define z∆p¨, s0q as follows. Define z∆p0, s0q “ 0 and recursively define:









q ` p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆qq
‰
.
Note that z∆ppt, s
1q is a lower bound on the continuation payoff that a worker can guarantee
at time t at state s1 in any equilibria. This is because the worker knows that ŵ∆ppτ q will
be offered for sure at time τ “ t̂∆ by Lemma 10. Thus the strategy of rejecting all offers
until time t̂∆ delivers the payoff of z∆ppt, s
1q. This then implies that z∆ppt, s0q is a lower
bound on the continuation payoff that a worker can guarantee for himself conditional on no
arrivals. As a result, all offers strictly below z∆ppt, s0q are rejected in all equilibria. Thus at
time t, conditional on state s0, the most that firm A can obtain if an agreement is reached is
Spptq ´ z∆ppt, s0q.
Now let us examine the incentives of firm A. Since we showed previously that in any
equilibrium, firm A’s continuation value after an arrival of firm B is 0, it is without loss
of generality to condition on the event s0. Clearly, Sppt̂∆´∆q ă W∆ppt̂∆´∆, z∆p¨, s
1qq since
z∆ppτ , s
1q “ ŵ∆ppτ q for all τ ě t̂∆. This together with Lemma 4 implies that for all t ă t̂∆,
Spptq ă W∆ppt, z∆p¨, s
1qq. Therefore, for all t ă t̂∆,
St ´ z∆ppt, s0q ă e
´pr`λq∆Et rmaxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ z∆ppt`∆, s0qus .
Iterating, we obtain:
St ´ z∆ppt, s0q ă e
´pr`λqpt̂∆´tqEt
“




maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
‰
.
As a result, it is never incentive compatible for firm A to hire the worker at time t. 
All together these lemmas imply Theorem 1.
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D.2 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof of Theorem 2: First note that firm A only receives positive surplus when there are
no arrivals of firm B before t̂∆. In the event that firm B does not arrive before t̂∆, in any
equilibrium, firm A hires the worker for a wage of ŵ∆pp̂∆q at time t̂∆ (conditional on no
slip-ups). As a result, firm A’s payoff is
e´pr`λqt̂∆E0
“
maxt0, Sppt̂∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt̂∆qu
‰
in any equilibrium. This shows that all equilibria are payoff-equivalent for firm A.
To prove point 4, note that efficiency is maximized when the time of hiring is as close to t˚∆
as possible. By Theorem 1, we know that hiring will take place at least before t̂∆ in states s0
and s1 in all equilibria. Thus clearly E˚∆ is the most efficient equilibrium. By the same token,
note that E∆ is the least efficient equilibrium.
To analyze the payoffs of firm B and the worker, let ΠA, ΠB, and Πw denote the corre-
sponding payoffs of the players in a particular equilibrium.
By the previous observations, ΠA is constant across all equilibria. Thus if there is an
equilibrium that simultaneously minimizes efficiency and maximizes the worker’s payoff, this
equilibrium will also minimize ΠB. We will show that indeed E∆ achieves this. To see this,
note that by Lemma 8, the worker’s payoffs are bounded above by ŵ∆pp0q. Thus, Πw is max-
imized in equilibrium E∆. Furthermore, we previously observed that efficiency is minimized
in equilibrium E∆. This then implies that ΠB is minimized in equilibrium E∆.
Similarly, by Theorem 1, we know that in all equilibria, in state s1, firm A offers ŵ∆pptq
for all pt ě p̂. It ensues that Πw is minimized in equilibrium E˚∆. Furthermore this is the
equilibrium that simultaneously maximizes efficiency and so ΠB must be maximized in E˚∆. 
E Proofs of Section 7
E.1 Limit Results: ∆ Ñ 0
First, we show the convergence of first-best stopping times and beliefs.
Lemma 12. For all p P p0, 1q, t˚ppq “ lim∆Ñ0 t
˚
∆ppq and thus p




Proof: Note that t˚∆ satisfies the following set of inequalities:
e´r∆Et˚∆´∆
”





ą 0 ą e´r∆Et˚∆
”





















But the above implies that lim∆Ñ0 cp1´pt˚∆qη´rSppt
˚
∆





In order to show convergence of p̂∆, we need to establish uniform convergence of V∆ and
ŵ∆.
Lemma 13. As ∆ Ñ 0, V∆ppq Ñ V ppq and ŵ∆ppq Ñ ŵppq uniformly for all p.
Proof: Note that the function T ÞÑ Ee´rT rmaxt0, SppT qu|p0 “ ps is continuous, hence, uni-
formly continuous on bounded intervals. Moreover, the limit limTÑ8 Ee´rT rmaxt0, SppT qu|p0 “ ps “
0. Therefore, lim∆Ñ0 V∆ppq “ V ppq point-wise. By Dini’s theorem, if we consider the sequence
∆, ∆
2
, . . . , i.e., we cut the time intervals in half at every step, then the convergence must be
uniform because p is in a compact set, V is continuous in p, and V∆ppq is continuous in p and
decreasing in ∆.
Recall that by (2) ŵ∆ppq “ Ere´rT̂V∆ppT̂ q|p0 “ ps where T̂ {∆ is geometrically distributed
with success rate p1´ βqp1´ e´λ∆q. We can write















Then, almost surely, PrpT̂“tq
∆
¨e´rtV∆pptq converges uniformly in t to e
´p1´βqλtp1´βqλ¨e´rtV pptq
because the path t ÞÑ pt converges uniformly in t almost surely and V∆ converges uni-









βqλe´rtV pptq dt. Then, the convergence of ŵ∆ follows from the bounded convergence theorem
since V∆ppq, V ppq ă b. 
Finnaly, we show convergence of t̂ and p̂.
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Lemma 14. lim∆Ñ0 t̂∆ “ t̂ and hence lim∆Ñ0 p̂∆ “ p̂.






e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
ą Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ă t̂∆
Et
“
e´pr`λq∆ maxt0, Sppt`∆q ´ ŵ∆ppt`∆qu
‰
ă Spptq ´ ŵ∆pptq if t ě t̂∆.



































e´r∆pβŵ∆ppt`∆q ` p1´ βqV∆ppt`∆qq
“ ŵpptqpr ` λ` ηp1´ ptqq ` λpβŵpptq ` p1´ βqV pptqq.
by Lemma 13. Moreover, maxt0, Sppt`∆qu ´ Sppt`∆q “ 0 as long as Sppt`∆q ě 0. Thus, the
definition of pt̂∆ implies that as ∆ Ñ 0, it must solve




p1´ βqV pp̂q ` βŵppq
¯ı
. (11)
This proofs the lemma. 
E.2 Comparative Statics
Proof of Lemma 3: p̂ satisfies:








rSpp˚q “ cηp1´ p˚q. (13)
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For p ě p˚, V ppq “ Sppq. Moreover ŵppq ă V ppq, for all p. Thus, at p˚ the term in the
squared bracket in (12) is positive. This implies that p̂ ă p˚.
That p̂ is decreasing in β follows from noting that the term in the squared bracket in (12)
is decreasing in β since (a) ŵ is decreasing in β by virtue of (6), (b) ŵppq ă V ppq for all p.
We are only left to show that p̂ tends to p˚ if λ tends to either zero or infinity. Setting λ “ 0
in (12) yields (13). This yields one part. For the second part, divide through by λ in (12). In
the limit as λ tends to infinity, we obtain 0 “ Spp̂q ´ V pp̂q since, by (6), ŵppq tends to V ppq
as λ tends to infinity. But V pp˚q “ Spp˚q. This concludes the second part.

Proof of Theorem 3: Immediate from Lemma 3 and the observation that in E˚∆, conditional
on no slip-up before then, with probability 1 the worker is hired the instant the belief hits p̂.

Proof of Proposition 3: We first show that Π˚A is decreasing in λ. Let λ2 ą λ1. Note
that it is enough to show that for the reservation wages we have w2pp, s0q ě w1pp, s0q for all
p P rp̂2, p̂1s if p̂2 ă p̂1 or all p P rp̂1, p̂2s if p̂1 ă p̂2. We consider each case in turn.
Case (i): p̂2 ă p̂1. We then have, for all p P rp̂2, p̂1s:
w1pp, s0q ď ŵ2ppq “ w2pp, s0q.
Case (ii): p̂1 ă p̂2. Suppose that we can find p P rp̂1, p̂2s such that w2pp, s0q ă w1pp, s0q. Since
p ą p̂1, under λ1, when the belief is p firm A prefers to hire the worker than wait until the
belief hits p̂2. The same must therefore be true under λ2 as well since A’s payoff from hiring
the worker at p is now higher, whereas A’s payoff from waiting until p̂2 is lower. So, under λ2,
when the belief is p firm A prefers to hire the worker than wait until the belief hits p̂2. This
contradicts the definition of p̂2.
Next we show that Π˚w is increasing in λ. As t̂ is firm A’s optimal hiring time, we have
t̂ “ arg max
tě0
e´pr`λqtpp0 ` p1´ p0qe
´ηt
qpSt ´ ŵtq.
Let us write the objective function here as F ptq.
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Consider next the coalition made up of the worker and firm A, under the constraint that














This shows that waiting until t̂ is the coalition’s optimal policy. Hence:












q ` p1´ βqVτ q dτ
` e´pr`λqt
`




Let us write the objective function above as Hptq. Furthermore, observe that




p0 ` p1´ p0qe
´ηt
˘ `




Let us write the objective function here as Gptq. Notice that Gpt̂q “ Hpt̂q. This allows us to
write
Π˚w “ Gpt̂q ´ F pt̂q.










Gpt̂q ´ F pt̂q
˘







Gpt̂q ´ F pt̂q
˘
.





βVt ` p1´ βqe
´rt







which is increasing in λ. Thus, Π˚w is increasing in λ.
The proof that Π˚w is decreasing in β and Π
˚
A increasing β rests on arguments similar to
those used to show that Π˚A is decreasing in λ, and is therefore omitted. Finally that Π
˚
w tends
to W ˚ as λ tends to infinity, and Π˚A tends to W
˚ as λ tends to zero rests on the arguments
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used to show Lemma 3. When λ tends to zero ŵp¨q tends to zero as well. When λ tends to
infinity ŵp¨q tends to V p¨; pS, rqq, and p̂ tends to p˚pS, rq. Thus, as λ approaches infinity, firm
A offers a wage approaching Spp˚q at a belief approaching p˚.

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